(Published in The Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia)
Although France's new leadership has been more hawkish in its Iran pronouncements than the Bush Administration, which has yet to go further than the perfunctory "all options are on the table" statements, speculation has grown that a U.S. attack on Iran may be only a matter of months away.
And not for nothing. Iraq has gone from a boil to a simmer for the first time since the explosion in civil strife after February of 2006, allowing attention to turn elsewhere. Four years of European diplomacy have done absolutely nothing to dissuade Iran from going nuclear. And Iran is increasingly, if indirectly, killing Western troops and sabotaging the new democracies of the Middle East. All potentially pointing to an armed confrontation with Iran. But with an anti-war Congress that has already signaled opposition to action against Iran, is there even a possibility of such a thing?
It was not so many years ago that another "lame duck" president, facing a hostile Congress and a United Nations Security Council veto, launched an air war. In March of 1999, President Bill Clinton had 22 months remaining in his final term. Both houses of Congress were vehemently opposed to the Administration, so much so that the House of Representatives had recently made Clinton only the second president to be impeached. Russia, on the Security Council, was certain to veto any resolution for action against Russia's "little brothers," the Serbs.
Nonetheless, invoking the support of NATO, Clinton waged a 78-day air war on Serbia over the issue of Kosovo, and by the time the bombs stopped dropping, Congress had done as it usually does and capitulated to the Commander-in-Chief, funding the operations with money to spare.
This was the trend through the 1990s. It is mistaken for a placid period, but the military missions came one after another: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, plus many strikes on Iraq, attacks against Afghanistan and Sudan, and a major show of force off Taiwan. All while the United States Armed Forces was being hacked to half its 1992 size, leaving a rump of the Cold War army that would have to improvise and take up the new war against Islamic fascism as of 2001. Congress might as well have stayed home. The Clinton Administration ordered half a dozen military actions citing UN resolutions or NATO support, but without the advance approval of Congress, and often over Congressional opposition.
The Bush Administration, for all the Iraq resolution rejections at the UN Security Council, did seek and receive prior Congressional consent for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, in the 2001 and 2002 "Authorization for Use of Military Force" resolutions, on top of the standing Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.
Of course, the aerial campaigns of the 1990s are an order of magnitude or two down from the full-scale, "boots-on-the-ground," regime-changing wars of today, but it is mainly '90s-style air strikes that are being considered for Iran.
The most pertinent U.S. law in the Iran case may be the 1973 War Powers Act. It was passed by a radicalized post-Vietnam Congress, overriding a veto by President Richard Nixon, and was intended to restrict the role of Commander-in-Chief. But it actually codified the principle that a president can order military action without Congressional authorization, requiring only that the president seek approval within 60 days -- assuming the operation has lasted that long -- and report to Congress within 48 hours.
Presidents since Nixon have tended to take a dim view of the War Powers Act -- Clinton called it "constitutionally defective" -- but it remains the most explicit expression in law of the Congressional view on war powers.
If all this is a sullying of the U.S. Constitution, it is one with a long and respectable pedigree. The United States has used military force a couple hundred times in its couple of centuries; the majority of those deployments have lacked Congressional consent, and only five times has Congress actually declared war as per the Constitution. The subordination of Congress, in its current form, started with President Harry Truman in 1950, and subsequent administrations have entrenched the practice of committing U.S. forces first and asking for permission later, if at all.
Part of the rationale for this is legitimate enough: The necessity of immediate action or an element of surprise. Conducting public hearings, debates, and votes on a military mission for weeks or months beforehand does let the cat out of the bag. But the motivations are also less noble. Congresses are often hostile to the executive branch and likely to automatically refuse approval for "the president's war," administrations tend to view Congress as a second-rate institution on matters of war and peace, and Congresses can be divided, not to mention loath to claim responsibility for risky missions. So presidents often invoke the fullest interpretation of the Commander-in-Chief mantle, and order an operation unilaterally, Congress notwithstanding.
We would be getting ahead of ourselves to assume there will necessarily be an Iran attack. The sabres have yet to be rattled by the Bush Administration, after all. But the question is effectively the President's to decide. He will order strikes on Iran or not, and his lame duck status, the disposition of Congress, and the vetoes on the UN Security Council will have much less to do with it than his judgement of the costs of action and inaction.
Andrew W. Smith/Andrew Smith, Tulsa, Oklahoma and Cape Sable Island, Nova Scotia
Showing posts with label kosovo war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label kosovo war. Show all posts
October 12, 2007
April 28, 2007
War by Committee, or Commander
“War by committee” is not just a figure of speech. The Continental Congress managed the Revolutionary War literally by committee, and by all accounts made a sufficient hash of it that when the Constitution was crafted in the Revolution’s wake, the new presidency was invested with the power of waging war.
But Congress was also constitutionally empowered in matters of national defense, to authorize and fund war. So, Congressional anti-warriors looking to withdraw from Iraq could move to either repeal their authorization of the war or de-fund the mission. Congressional attempts to determine troop levels or areas of operation, and even to specify which of their enemies the troops are allowed fighting, would seem to be pushing things constitutionally, and, in any event, would draw a presidential veto.
If Congress were to rescind its Iraq Resolution of 2002, the motion would assuredly be vetoed upon arrival at the White House. Congress could override a presidential veto with a vote of at least two-thirds in both the House and Senate, but the Congressional anti-war bloc is still far from that two-thirds threshold in either chamber.
And the de-funding option presents Congress with a Catch-22. Failing to undo its authorization of the war but halting payment for the on-going operations would place Congress in the position of leaving troops in the field but denying them the wherewithal to fight or even defend themselves. The number of Congressmen prepared to cast such a vote at present does not amount to 51 percent.
Plus which, for all the popular discontent over the war, support for simply de-funding it is in the single digits, according to an April 13 CBS News poll: 9 percent.
Congressional antagonism toward war efforts and war-time presidents is practically as old as the institutions themselves. As the president is commander-in-chief, and as the presidency and Congress are so often held by different parties, Congress can easily wind up as the anti-war branch of the U.S. government.
Only eight years ago, President Clinton launched the Kosovo War with NATO, but without Congress. Twice, a declaration of war resolution was rejected by Congress, as was even an authorization for the on-going air campaign. 26 Congressmen challenged the president’s war in court as unconstitutional for lacking Congressional authority. Nonetheless, Congress actually over-funded the war appropriation and authorized the use of U.S. troops for the post-war occupation.
The Vietnam War was a constitutional chess match between the legislative and executive branches. President Kennedy began the American intervention without Congressional authorization. The operation became full-scale war under President Johnson when he orchestrated Congressional approval for the escalation, which Congress revoked seven years later.
During the Nixon Presidency, Congress invoked its power of the purse to de-fund “combat operations” in the region, although by that stage the American military effort had effectively ended. Of more practical consequence was Congress’ de-funding of the native resistance in South Vietnam and Cambodia, which assured Communist victories and the exodus, abuse, and slaughter of literally millions who had opposed the Communists, or were deemed anti-Communist, in those countries.
The president exploited his power of shifting Congressional defense allocations, to fund operations in Cambodia and Laos which Congress had not provided for, and Congress exploited its power of ratifying treaties, to void agreements the President had negotiated with North Vietnam.
Two decades earlier, President Truman went to war in Korea citing a United Nations resolution and bypassing the Congress. In the 1950 midterm elections only months later, the president’s party lost 52 seats in the House and eight in the Senate. Divisions in the new Congress precluded a concerted legislative challenge to the war, though there was rancorous rhetoric enough. And when the great Gen. Douglass MacArthur gave his immortal Farewell Address after rebelling against Truman so flagrantly that the president was compelled to dismiss him, it was to a rapturous U.S. Congress.
President Wilson had campaigned in 1916 on keeping America out of the First World War, only to lead the nation into the war and institute a draft the following year, and a scant six days before the Great War ended in November 1918, the President’s party went from majority to minority in both the House and Senate, the latter having the Constitutional responsibility for ratifying treaties. So when the post-war Versailles Treaty -- which was very largely the doing of President Wilson and which included American membership in the League of Nations -- came before the hostile U.S. Senate, it was rejected. Twice.
And that is to say nothing of the constitutional confrontations over war before the 20th Century.
With the return to a Congress and presidency divided by party after last year’s midterms, Capitol Hill and the White House have assumed their accustomed adversarial roles, though there are some more novel twists this time around, like the House Speaker arrogating an executive diplomatic role in the Mideast. The balance can always tilt, and politics never stands still, but realistically, Congress today has little chance of reversing the Iraq policy in this latest showdown between the legislative and executive.
Andrew W. Smith / Andrew Smith, Tulsa, Oklahoma and Cape Sable Island, Nova Scotia
Published in The Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia
But Congress was also constitutionally empowered in matters of national defense, to authorize and fund war. So, Congressional anti-warriors looking to withdraw from Iraq could move to either repeal their authorization of the war or de-fund the mission. Congressional attempts to determine troop levels or areas of operation, and even to specify which of their enemies the troops are allowed fighting, would seem to be pushing things constitutionally, and, in any event, would draw a presidential veto.
If Congress were to rescind its Iraq Resolution of 2002, the motion would assuredly be vetoed upon arrival at the White House. Congress could override a presidential veto with a vote of at least two-thirds in both the House and Senate, but the Congressional anti-war bloc is still far from that two-thirds threshold in either chamber.
And the de-funding option presents Congress with a Catch-22. Failing to undo its authorization of the war but halting payment for the on-going operations would place Congress in the position of leaving troops in the field but denying them the wherewithal to fight or even defend themselves. The number of Congressmen prepared to cast such a vote at present does not amount to 51 percent.
Plus which, for all the popular discontent over the war, support for simply de-funding it is in the single digits, according to an April 13 CBS News poll: 9 percent.
Congressional antagonism toward war efforts and war-time presidents is practically as old as the institutions themselves. As the president is commander-in-chief, and as the presidency and Congress are so often held by different parties, Congress can easily wind up as the anti-war branch of the U.S. government.
Only eight years ago, President Clinton launched the Kosovo War with NATO, but without Congress. Twice, a declaration of war resolution was rejected by Congress, as was even an authorization for the on-going air campaign. 26 Congressmen challenged the president’s war in court as unconstitutional for lacking Congressional authority. Nonetheless, Congress actually over-funded the war appropriation and authorized the use of U.S. troops for the post-war occupation.
The Vietnam War was a constitutional chess match between the legislative and executive branches. President Kennedy began the American intervention without Congressional authorization. The operation became full-scale war under President Johnson when he orchestrated Congressional approval for the escalation, which Congress revoked seven years later.
During the Nixon Presidency, Congress invoked its power of the purse to de-fund “combat operations” in the region, although by that stage the American military effort had effectively ended. Of more practical consequence was Congress’ de-funding of the native resistance in South Vietnam and Cambodia, which assured Communist victories and the exodus, abuse, and slaughter of literally millions who had opposed the Communists, or were deemed anti-Communist, in those countries.
The president exploited his power of shifting Congressional defense allocations, to fund operations in Cambodia and Laos which Congress had not provided for, and Congress exploited its power of ratifying treaties, to void agreements the President had negotiated with North Vietnam.
Two decades earlier, President Truman went to war in Korea citing a United Nations resolution and bypassing the Congress. In the 1950 midterm elections only months later, the president’s party lost 52 seats in the House and eight in the Senate. Divisions in the new Congress precluded a concerted legislative challenge to the war, though there was rancorous rhetoric enough. And when the great Gen. Douglass MacArthur gave his immortal Farewell Address after rebelling against Truman so flagrantly that the president was compelled to dismiss him, it was to a rapturous U.S. Congress.
President Wilson had campaigned in 1916 on keeping America out of the First World War, only to lead the nation into the war and institute a draft the following year, and a scant six days before the Great War ended in November 1918, the President’s party went from majority to minority in both the House and Senate, the latter having the Constitutional responsibility for ratifying treaties. So when the post-war Versailles Treaty -- which was very largely the doing of President Wilson and which included American membership in the League of Nations -- came before the hostile U.S. Senate, it was rejected. Twice.
And that is to say nothing of the constitutional confrontations over war before the 20th Century.
With the return to a Congress and presidency divided by party after last year’s midterms, Capitol Hill and the White House have assumed their accustomed adversarial roles, though there are some more novel twists this time around, like the House Speaker arrogating an executive diplomatic role in the Mideast. The balance can always tilt, and politics never stands still, but realistically, Congress today has little chance of reversing the Iraq policy in this latest showdown between the legislative and executive.
Andrew W. Smith / Andrew Smith, Tulsa, Oklahoma and Cape Sable Island, Nova Scotia
Published in The Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia
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