Dissecting the Iraq Insurgency

First was the war itself, against Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime, over officially in six weeks and effectively in three. That much, at least, was a smashing success, but proved to be the relatively easy bit.

Then came the “dead-enders”. Baathist die-hards, Saddam loyalists, Sunni-minority "rejectionists" and militants generally, not vanquished in the war proper. Sunni militants remain a force in Iraq, causing trouble enough to become the target of a Diyala province sweep only days ago.

But sheer demographic inferiority, a small share of Iraq’s oil resources, revulsion at the jihadists’ war on civilians and their imposition of Sharia, and hatred and fear of Iran and its Shiite Trojan horses in Iraq -- coupled with American cultivation of potential Sunni allies -- have been altering the equation. The Baath-connected Islamic Army in Iraq recently released a video proposing negotiations with the United States, presumably for some amnesty-for-peace deal, as well as criticizing its former al Qaeda ally and declaring Iran, not America, to be Iraq’s greatest threat. So there is reason to believe that some Sunni elements of the insurgency want out.

Then there were the jihadists -- mainly foreigners -- especially al Qaeda in Iraq. Osama bin Laden himself called Baghdad the “epicenter of jihad,” and jihadists ceaselessly slaughtered civilians in an effort to foment a civil war to undo the democracy project and leave a power vacuum, as well as established the beginnings of a Sharia “caliphate” in pockets of Iraq they controlled, however temporarily.

That times have been better for Iraq’s al Qaeda legion was confirmed in the September statement by its new leader, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, who came to his position after his predecessor, Zarqawi, was dispatched by two U.S. missiles last summer. The statement acknowledged the loss of 4,000 foreign fighters and issued a desperate-sounding plea for nuclear and biological weapons scientists, flailing for a miracle weapon to salvage their situation: "The field of jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions, and the large American bases are good places to test your unconventional weapons….”

And if a recent poll is any indication, al Qaeda’s troubles in Iraq have been not only military, but ideological. A Program on International Policy Attitudes poll released September 27 found a near-unanimous 94 percent of Iraqis viewing al Qaeda unfavorably, with 93 percent disapproval for Osama bin Laden. So consider that battle for “hearts and minds” going badly for the international jihad.

Even Iraq’s Sunnis, the most inclined to sympathy for al Qaeda, are turning. 25 of the 31 tribes in the mainly-Sunni Anbar province -- where nightmarish Fallujah, Haditha, and Ramadi are located -- volunteered last month to actually fight al Qaeda and other jihadists, and support the new Iraqi government. Al Qaeda can count only six of the 31 Anbar tribes as allies.

Al Qaeda in Iraq remains a menace, and seems to be changing tactics, but in response to its diminished fortunes.

Which leaves the current, fourth phase of the conflict in Iraq: Shiite militancy. Shiite militants may have been spurred partly to revenge the decades of bloody Sunni tyranny, or the intentional, daily mass-slaughter of Shiite civilians by al Qaeda and other Sunni jihadists in Iraq. It may even be that Shiite killers helped polish off some of the other militants, but today it is they -- most prominently the Mahdi Army of militant cleric Muqtada al-Sadr -- who constitute arguably the primary source of violence and unrest in Iraq.

Complicating matters is the fact that the Shiite militants have confederates in Iraq’s new government, who at least turn a blind eye to Shiite violence and malfeasance. And to truly introduce a monkey wrench to the works, much of the Shiite militancy is sponsored by the Shiite theocracy in neighbouring Iran. Iran is fighting another proxy war, this one against Iraqi democracy and the “Great and Little Satans”: the English-speaking powers.

American forces in Iraq were long ago reporting that the “Improvised Explosive Devices” threatening them daily were not so “improvised” anymore. They are often machined, manufactured, military-grade bombs, “shaped charges” that force a blast of molten metal through a cone, focusing it enough to penetrate even tanks. More recently, American and British forces have intercepted these devices in transit to Iraq from Iran.

Cash, training, and more advanced weaponry bearing official Iranian armament hallmarks, like anti-tank rockets and surface-to-air missiles, have lately been added to what is known of Iran’s assistance to anyone in Iraq intending havoc and bloodshed, especially the Shiites among them.

But a “senior U.S. military official” in Iraq, speaking to Reuters last month, did optimistically observe that even those Iranian-allied militants are feeling the need to distance themselves from Iran to maintain credibility among the Iraqi people, and added, “by the way, nobody in this country stays bought. You're rented.”

Andrew W. Smith, Cape Sable Island, Nova Scotia and Tulsa, Oklahoma

Published in The Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, Nova Scotia